Chapter 2
The task of regulation
... Material from John Buckley
預備知識
一件事物的多種看法－－－But still only One thing
分類是為了便於學習與瞭解；並非分割。
EX. 光的雙重性
光是粒子（物質）
光是波動（能量）
Why exist?
兩種很難融合解釋的特性在一件事物身上
測量標準的不同
電信法規的現象－－－ But still only One thing
結合公共行政與行政法學、公眾的選擇（public choice）、產業經濟分析、政府管制的施行與研究。
預備知識
行政法學
社會共同生活所形成（排除私行為）
公益取向（排除私行為）
主動積極、注重未來（對照純粹司法---不告不理之消極性格）
具體措施處理個案為主（相對於純粹立法行為制定抽象、一般性規範為主，強調行政係執行權）
行政分類（某些與我們的工作有關的分類摘要，詳下頁）
預備知識
監管行政
特別領域中，以防止對公共秩序與安全的危害為主的行政。
例如經濟營業監管
公課行政
徵收租稅性質之金錢與非租稅性質之規費、受益費。（電信號碼費、網址註冊費）
導控行政
追求特定行政與政策目標，作為直接或間接指導、規劃、管制之行政。
物價督導、配給措施（頻譜拍賣也有類似現象）
預備知識
市場的失靈與政府的失靈
市場的失靈
缺乏市場進行交易或市場無法正常運作（看不見的手不能正常發揮功用）。
政府的失靈
政府可採取各種措施調整資源配置，由於民主政治的缺陷使政府未必能扮演資源重分配角色。
預備知識
民法的由來－我國繼受外國民法的歷史與民法的結構
我國法律學自德、日、瑞士
德、日、瑞士 －－＞ 日爾曼人－－＞ 西元五世紀時還是蠻族
日爾曼人 蠻族的法律那裏來呢?
答案：原來的部落法律與向羅馬人移留下的法律學來
羅馬人的商業文明發達，商品交易繁多
需要法律解決紛爭 －－＞ 物權（所有權）觀念在當時已很發達
物權 －－＞ 債權（資本主義社會的法律基礎）
親屬與繼承
物換星移，代間移轉
Chapter 2
2.1 Why regulate?
2.1.1 Mission and goals
市場秩序(ethics)
產業標準建立
消費者保護
產業基礎建設 (例如技職訓練)
電信產業的Mission and Goal
與國際脈動同步運作
一般國民→普及服務；
工商業及其它部門→廣泛與深入的運用
追求成本效率與社會一般人可購得的服務
令人接受的競爭程度
市場價格的決定模型---消費者免於吃虧而生產者有改善生產效率的誘因
Chapter 2
2.1.2 Reasons for intervention
市場失靈（Market failure ）
普及服務
2.1.3 Reasons for sector-specific intervention（為何電信市場須需特別管制）
主導業者存在（先佔優勢）
獨佔、高度垂直整合、網路外部性
電信技術複雜，需特別法規機關管制
2.1.4 Outcomes of regulation
不作market management
Outcome indicators：資費趨勢下降、國際比較、市場占有率分散化程度
Chapter 2
2.2 Markets and market failure
2.2.1 Classic causes of market failure
Non-excludable goods and services
無排它性：路燈、廣播、健保（缺乏反映市場價格機制、數位廣播例外）
Inefficient exclusion
成交價格（Price ）遠大於 Marginal Cost
Missing Market
特殊號碼屯積不賣
Information asymmetry
導致用戶夠買太多不需用到的電信服務
Chapter 2
Common property resources（自然資源）
自然資源缺乏市場機制反應成本
radio、numbering、addressing capacity
Externalities
網路互聯
一個特例：被叫用戶接受主叫用戶付費
Monopolistic supply
Bottleneck or single resource such as Microsoft OS in common access system
Set of keys in broadcasting
Chapter 2
2.2.2 Classification of markets and market power
Derived markets（上下游關係）
Retail supply of Internet access depends on a derived market for the supply of PSTN access
Broadband services market similarly depends on a derived market for local loop access
Telecommunications service types
Basic local network access
Call minutes（local、long distance、international）
Mobile telephony
Number translation services
Information services
Leased line services
Various types of apparatus supply
Chapter 2
Oftel 對Market Power的觀點（ For Consumer ）
Consumers enjoy the best or near-best deal as compared with similar economics
（消費者的消費經驗與類似經濟活動無差別）
A wide range of services is available（廣泛的服務隨手可得）
Consumbers are satisfied with service quality（消費者滿意服務品質）
Prices are broadly reflective of underlying cost（i.e. there is absence of persistent monopoly profits）（服務價格趨近於正常利潤下的價格）
Consumers are able to access information to make effective choices, and are confident in using this information to take advantage of opportunities
Chapter 2
Oftel 對Market Power的觀點（ For Supplier ）
Firms compete on price, quality and innovation（價格、品質、non-price acctivities 非價格競爭活動）
Anti-competitive behaviours is absent（妨害競爭行為未出現）
Collusion（勾結） is not present（無勾結現像）
Service provision meets consumer needs and is efficient（服務有效率）
Chapter 2
Oftel 對Market Power的觀點（ For Market Structure ）
No inefficient suppliers（資源最適配置）
Consumers do not face barriers to switch suppliers（such as NP）
Entry barriers are limited, so that threat of entry is a competitive discipline
（廠商進入限制不高）
Operators with market power in related markets （through vertical or horizontal integration）have limited opportunity to lever this dominance into the market segment in question（獨佔廠商運用獨佔優勢有困難）
Players may be found who have recently entered the market（近期內市場有新加入者）
The market structure displays change over time, especially by reducing concentration（市場集中度下降）
Chapter 2
European Commission 對Market Power 的觀點
Overall size of company
Control of infrastructure not readily duplicated（基礎建設非雙占性質）
Technological advantage or superiority
Easy or privileged access to capital markets and sources of finance（從資本市場取得資金的容易度）
Economies of scale（經濟規模）
Economies of scope（reference ： Fab of Quimond in Dresdend of Germany獲得EC通過德國政府可補貼50億歐元使Quimond在歐洲繼續生產 Dram；歐洲惟一的Dram Fab）
Vertical integration（垂直整合）
Developed distribtion and sales network（發展完成的分配與銷售通路）
Chapter 2
Absence of potential competition（潛在競爭者無法出現）
管制機關須辨識市場處於何種型態
區別 Sgnificant market power（SMP）and the reminder
對 SMP 採取 asymmetric regulation
Case Study ：英國National fixed wireline market 下的 incumbent monopolist 即被視為SMP而採取 asymmetric regulation
2.2.3 Working definitions of market power
歐洲對市場集中度看法的歷史脈絡
Market share 25% setted subject to SMP
Then market share 40% setted subject to SMP
Then for
a. 精確定義
與
b. 避免「規避占有率調查」
Chapter 2
採用 Herfindahl-Hirschmann index of market dominance
HHI = Σ i ( 100 S i )
Chapter 2
Chapter 2
補充
Chapter 2
2.3 Abuse of market power
2.3.1 Overview
Stop the consumer from enjoying a better or cheaper service than he or she could otherwise have obtained from a competitor.
Regulator’s responsibility is
a. to identify market abuse
b. to intervene in the market to prevent it
Chapter 2
2.3.2 Predatory pricing
Definition：蓄意（deliberately）先已低價銷售打擊競爭對手，隨後再抬高售價以補償（offset）損失。
狡滑性的方式：損失一定比例的固定成本來銷售，非已極低價格銷售
此方法在電信業並非很嚴重的問題（兩個檢定方法）
Standard-alone cost（SAC、獨支成本分攤法）
獨支成本分攤法係採用「個別營業個體」做為每一個「成本標的」計算之資訊，以決定成本分攤之權數。
如售價低於此成本數則為 evidence of the Predatory price。
Incremental cost test （增額成本分攤法）
增額成本分攤法係將成本標的加以排序，然後以排序順位分攤成本給使用者。
排序第一的成標的稱為主要單位，按獨立個體分攤成本；
排序第二的成本標的稱為增額單位，增額單位僅分攤由兩個使用者較前一使用者使用時所增加之額外共同成本。
如售價低於此成本數則為 evidence of the Predatory price。
Chapter 2
2.3.3 Margin squeeze
Definition：Supplier with market power provides a wholesale input to a company and which it also competes in the provision of the corresponding end-user retail service.
Example：wholesale transport of long-distance calls by incumbent telecommunication operators is a common example.
More serious concern than predatory pricing ; On account of its relative difficulty of detection
Chapter 2
Margin Pr – Pi is the amount avaliable to the competitor for its cost and profit
SMP operator raises the wholesale price and reduces the retail price .
Weaken the competitor’s business
Test Method
M = Pr – Pi ＞＝Cv – ( Ce – Ci )
Pr and Pi meaning as above
Cv means avoided cost of not supplying the retail output
Ce means cost of supplying the intermediate output ot an external party
Ci means the equivalent cost of internal supply
Hard to obtain the correct values!
Chapter 2
2.3.4 Discrimination
歧視性售價政策 Definition：a supplier sells the same product at different prices in different markets or to different customers, and where there is no objective economic justification for that difference.
Individual negotiation of price and discounts is an element of discriminatory pricing.
Chapter 2
2.3.5 Boundling or linkage of sales
Definition：products and services are sold in combinations chosen by the supplier.
Example 1, basic exchange line service with its maintenance
Example 2, basic exchange line plus long distance service
Pricing strategy exert
Buying single service is relatively high.
Buying bundle service is relatively low.
Chapter 2
2.3.6 Exclusive dealing arrangements
Various kind of types
Unfair Competition Character
Example, A big company exerts a large purchasing power to persuade a supplier to aggre not to supply certain items to its competitors.
Chapter 2
2.3.7 Cross-subsidy
Definition：Sales Portofolio is profitable as a whole while having less profitable and even loss-making products in its portfolio.
Example, the cross-subsidy by an SMP operator from its monopoly network operation to its competitive business of apparatus supply.
Test for cross-subsidy is difficult.
Stand alone cost and incremental cost tests are insufficient to prove the absence of cross-subsidy.
監理機關可用的手法是要求 operator 以 business units 記帳以便監督成本狀況是否交叉補貼.
Chapter 2
2.3.8 Intellectual property and information sharing
Sometimes Anti-competitive practice
Intellectual property Aspects as follows：
When interconnection, the operators have to disclose enough information to competitors in order to interconnect.
Such as location of exchanges、cable joint boxes、types of switch、transmission equipment in use、signalling system、protocols employed......
The above information maybe classified as National Security sites!
So only disclosure the necessity to let the competitor to know!
Chapter 2
Information sharing
If an operator holds patents necessary for interconnection with its network or the operation of a similar network, then failure to license them to other players （ or to ask a price so high that it was equivalent to refusal to supply）would exclude them from the market.
Chapter 2
A former monopoly operator will, by the nature of its operation, obtain a great deal of knowledge about its customers and their movements.
Sharing this, especially with its sales forces, is frequently considered an abuse of the dominant position.
For example, suppose a customer orders a private circute to a compettor’s telephone exchange.
The provisioning department at the SMP operator that handles this may be forced to practice information separation, being prohibited from passing this knowledge on to the long-distance telephony service salespeople.
They might then attempt persuasion of the customer, or pass on a tip that the customer may be looking for a PBX.
Where the regulator has reason to believe that certain classes of customer may be unaware of competitive sources of supply, it may require the SMP operator’s people and literature to make it clear that other suppliers exists.
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